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A Three-Pronged Approach: How the United States Can
Use WTO Disclosure Requirements to Curb Intellectual
Property Infringement in China
Mark Liang
Abstract
Counterfeiting and the piray of consumer goods in China are serious and globally
recognied problems. Despite concerns expressed by the US and past efforts, China has been
unable to enforce IP rights effectively for decades. As a result, American businesses seeking to
sell IP-protected goods in China suffer tens of billions of dollars in losses every year. This
Comment aims to determine and assess what measures the US may take to reduce IP
infringement in China in the short term. China's weak IP enforcement record is a result of
both long-term and short-term causes. Short-term causes (that is, causes that could be remedied
within the next five years) include problems with China's nascent judicial system, local
protectionism and economic dependence on IP infringement, under-deterrence, market access
limitations, and the vagueness of the TRIPS Agreement. However, the various proposals found
in existing literature for improving China's IP enforcement recordfail to adequately tackle these
short-term causes and are therefore unlikely to produce an immediate benefit.
The US should adopt a three-pronged approach to improve China's IP enforcement
record. First, the US should file a WTO complaint alleging an Article 63.1 violation. Article
63. 1 imposes transpareng standards on the adjudicative processes and regulations of WTO
member states. Second, the US and China should conclude a bilateral agreement providing
incentives forjoint ventures between American and Chinese companies. Joint ventures will give
Chinese companies an incentive to enforce their IP rghts since they will then hold an ownershej
stake. Third, the US should, either by filing a WTO complaint or through bilateral
negotiations, seek to reduce China's current market access barriers. However, because China 's
IP enforcement problem is largey a result of long-term causes, there may be little the US can
* The author would like to thank Professor Anu Bradford for her contributions and insights. The
author would also like to thank the board and staffers of the Chicago Journal of International Law
for their hard work and insights during the publication process.
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realistically do to bring about immediate and marked improvement in the effectiveness of
China's IP enforcement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property (IP) infringement in China is one of the most pressing
problems facing US-China relations. Recent estimates speculate that 86 percent
of all IP protected goods sold in China have been counterfeited or illegally
copied.' Other studies suggest the rate is above 90 percent.2 Rampant IP
infringement costs key "IP-dependent" sectors of the US economy billions each
year. For example, the US software and entertainment industries suffer between
$2.5 and $3.8 billion in lost sales each year.' In 2001, China's State Council
estimated the value of all pirated goods in China at $19 to $24 billion,
accounting for one-fourth of the US-China trade deficit for that year.4 China's
weak intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement problem poses an enormous
risk to US companies seeking to do business in China. Without adequate
protection of IP, lower-priced unauthorized copies of US companies' products
flood the Chinese consumer market, substituting legitimate and higher-priced
copies. China's weak IPR enforcement also increases the US-China trade deficit
(itself a sensitive economic and political issue) because sales of domestically
produced counterfeit copies replace sales of legitimate imported copies and
because it discourages US companies from exporting goods and services to
China. These problems will only multiply in size as the US and China continue
to increase bilateral trade and investment' and as the Chinese economy
continues to expand.6
The US has attempted to remedy the situation over the past two decades.
The 1990s were characterized by a pattern of US threats of trade sanctions, with
the intent that such sanctions would induce the Chinese government to crack
I Chun-Hsien Chen, Explaining Different Enforcement of Intellectual Property Protection in the United States,
Taiwan, and The People's Republic of China, 10 Tulane J Tech & Intel Prop 211, 213 (2007). US and
Taiwan rates are 21 percent and 43 percent respectively.
2 International Intellectual Property Alliance, 2004 Special 301 Report: People's Republic of China
("IIPA, 2004 Special301 Repor") 31 (2004).
3 Omario Kanji, Paper Dragon: Inadequate Protection of Intellectual Properly Rights in China, 27 Mich J Intl
L 1261, 1264 (2006).
4 Id.
5 See US Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics: Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports, and Trade Balance)
with China, online at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html (visited May 3,
2010).
6 See Indexmundi, China GDP - real growth rate, online at http://www.indexmundi.com/china/
gdp.real.growthrate.html (visited May 3, 2010).
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down on IPR violations.! Such threats typically failed, usually because the US
withdrew the threats out of concern over potential retaliatory Chinese measures.
In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO).' The WTO and its
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which is composed of the Dispute Panel
(Panel) and the Appellate Body (AB), resolves disputes concerning matters
within the scope of WTO agreements.10 The Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) covers IP matters." As a result
of China's membership in the WTO and the WTO's jurisdiction concerning
matters of international trade and international IP disputes, any US attempts to
tackle China's IPR enforcement problem now require the use of WTO
sanctions, rather than unilateral US action.12 In 2005, the US placed China on its
special priority "watch-list" of nations that were failing to meet their WTO
obligations." On August 13, 2007, in response to heavy industry pressure, the
US filed a WTO complaint alleging, among other things, that China was in
violation of TRIPS Article 61.1, which requires countries to adopt criminal
procedures and remedies for IPR protection.14 On January 26, 2009, the Panel
issued its opinion. With respect to the US' Article 61.1 claim, the WTO ruled
against the US, concluding that China's existing criminal procedures and
remedies were not inconsistent with Article 61.1.'
7 Elizabeth Chien-Hale, Intellectual Propery Aspects of Doing Business in China, 1626 PLI/Corp 109, 142
(2007).
8 Id.
9 Id at 122.
10 Id at 143.
11 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS"), Apr 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 33 ILM 1197
(1994).
12 Chien-Hale, 1626 PLI/Corp at 142 (cited in note 7).
13 Id at 143.
14 World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and
Enforcement of Intellectual Propery Rights ("China-IP') 1.2, WTO Doc No WT/DS362/R (Jan 26,
2009). The US complaint also alleged that (1) Chinese measures limited the ability of Chinese
authorities to order destruction or disposal of infringing goods as required by Articles 46 and 59
of TRIPS, and (2) the first sentence of Article 4 of China's Copyright Law is inconsistent with
Articles 9.1, 14, 41.1 and the first and second sentences of Article 61of TRIPS and Articles 5(1)
and 5(2) of the 1971 Berne Convention. Id, 3.1.
15 Id, 1 8.1. The US did prevail on its other two claims. The Panel found that (1) China's Copyright
Law, specifically the first sentence of Article 4, was inconsistent with China's obligations under
Article 5(1) of the 1971 Berne Convention, as incorporated by Article 9.1 of TRIPS, and Article
41.1 of TRIPS, and (2) China's customs measures were inconsistent with Article 59 of TRIPS
insofar as it incorporated the fourth sentence of Article 46 of TRIPS and it applied only to
imports to China.
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The US' efforts thus far to induce China to improve its IPR enforcement
efforts can best be summarized as a series of tentative measures that have
ultimately failed. These measures have been tentative in that the US, aware of
the sensitive and important economic relationship it has with China, has not
applied trade sanctions and has not as actively sought a WTO remedy as one
might expect (and as many US industry representatives have hoped), given the
magnitude of the problem. The efforts have ultimately failed. China has not
significantly changed its IPR enforcement policies or increased resources
towards IPR protection. Statistical measures of China's IPR enforcement record,
such as piracy rates or monetary value of lost revenues to US industry, indicate
that the situation is only worsening.
This Comment will propose US measures that are most likely to be
effective in significantly improving IPR protection in China in the short-term, with
short-term spanning approximately the next five years. In determining which US
measures are most promising, the Comment will make two fundamental
assumptions. First, any measures must avoid debilitating US-China diplomatic
and economic relations, since this would result in consequences that are in
neither the US' nor China's interests. This presumption precludes, for example,
the threatened trade sanctions of the 1990s, since trade wars would hinder
economic relations and interests. This assumption, however, does not preclude
WTO sanctions, even if instigated by a US complaint. Such sanctions-unlike
unauthorized unilateral US sanctions-are authorized by the WTO. While China
would not welcome having WTO sanctions imposed on it, it is less likely to view
such sanctions an illegitimate diplomatic or economic affront. WTO sanctions
are more likely to be considered fair game, imposed under a universally agreed-
upon and consented-to set of rules. China would also have adequate opportunity
to oppose such sanctions through the WTO adjudicative processes. The second
assumption is that the broad cause of China's weak IPR enforcement record is a
lack of political willpower. IPR enforcement is simply not a major national
priority for the Chinese government and industry at present. Over the past two
decades China has promulgated statutory IP laws and developed a judicial
system and administrative agencies to handle IP matters, all of which appear
superficially to meet TRIPS standards. Nevertheless, the judiciary, agencies, and
Chinese government have failed to enforce their IP laws effectively. The
problem then is not one of lack of legal or financial resources to devote to IPR
enforcement, but lack of concern for IPR enforcement.
This Comment is organized as follows. Part II analyzes the specific causes
of China's IPR enforcement problem. Part II.A discusses socioeconomic and
cultural causes that are likely to be irremediable in the short term. Part II.B
discusses logistical or political causes that are more conducive to short-term
resolution. Part III assesses US measures, which hold some promise, but are
ultimately unlikely to succeed in improving Chinese IPR protections. Part IV
Summer 2010
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proposes three US initiatives that are likely to improve Chinese IPR
enforcement: (1) filing a TRIPS Article 63.1 complaint alleging lack of
transparency in China's judiciary and agencies that handle IP matters; (2)
reducing market access barriers for US goods that are protected by IP; and (3)
striking a bilateral agreement that encourages joint ventures between US and
Chinese companies and facilitates IP ownership and enforcement for these joint
ventures. Part V concludes and notes that full and effective IP enforcement may
be impossible in the short-term because of the socioeconomic conditions in
China.
II. CAUSES OF CHINA'S WEAK IPR ENFORCEMENT RECORD
China's weak IPR enforcement record has multiple causes. These causes
can be divided into long-term causes-those that likely cannot be resolved in the
short-term or within five years-and short-term causes. Long-term causes of
China's IPR protection problem relate to socioeconomic or cultural conditions,
which necessarily take decades to change. Part II.A discusses long-term causes.
Short-term causes of China's IPR protection problem are more logistical or
political and can be overcome in a matter of a few years if the Chinese
government is willing to take action and allocate more resources towards IP
enforcement. Part II.B discusses short-term causes.
A. Causes Without Short-term Solutions
There are three long-term causes of China's IPR enforcement problem: (1)
average incomes in China are far lower than in developed countries like the US,
thereby increasing demand for cheaper illegitimate copies of IP-protected goods;
(2) China is a net importer of IP-protected products and accordingly does not
consider IP protection a national priority; and (3) China, due to historical
circumstance, is not culturally accustomed to recognizing IPRs. Each of these
causes is discussed in detail below.
1. Low average incomes in China.
According to World Bank figures, in 2008, the gross national income
(GNI) per capita (a rough measure of average income) in China was $2,770.16 By
comparison, the average GNI per capita in the US for that year was $44,970, and
the average for Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
16 World Bank, Gross National Income Per Capita 2008, Atlas Method and PPP (July 1, 2009), online at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf (visited May 3,
2010).
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(OECD)" states was $38,760." Average Chinese incomes are therefore far lower
than in developed nations. There is also a significant disparity in wealth between
rural and urban residents in China. Rural residents, which comprise 61 percent
of the total population," earn approximately one-third the income of urban
residents.2 0 Compounded with China's high savings rate of approximately 30 to
40 percent,2' the majority of Chinese workers earn less than one dollar of
disposable income per day.
This lack of disposable income means that legitimate copies of IP-
protected consumer goods are plainly unaffordable for the vast majority of
Chinese. Demand for cheaper counterfeit goods is therefore much higher than
demand for more expensive legitimate copies. Until Chinese incomes rise to
levels where legitimate copies of IP-protected goods become affordable, there
will continue to be a thriving demand for unauthorized copies. Raising average
Chinese incomes to OECD levels is not achievable in the short term. It is a
decades-long process. Low average incomes are therefore a cause of China's IPR
enforcement problem that is not resolvable in the short term.
2. China is a net importer of IP goods and services.
In general, nations that are net importers of IP-protected goods and
services are less likely to consider IPR protection as a priority. By contrast,
nations that are net exporters of IP-protected goods and services are more likely
to consider IPR protection as a priority. In other words, nations that import
more IP goods and services than they export, or have an "IP trade deficit," will
17 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD country Web Sites, online at
http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en_- 33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.htmI (visited
Mar 23, 2010). Member states include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic,
Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the US.
18 Computed by finding arithmetic mean of World Bank figures for all OECD nations. See World
Bank, GNI Per Capita 2008 (cited in note 16).
19 China-Profile, Urban and Rural Population in China, 1978 and 2002 (Sept 17, 2005), online at
http://www.china-profile.com/data/tab-rurpop- .htm (visited May 3, 2010).
20 Jason Subler, China urban-rural income gap continues to widen, Reuters (Jan 24, 2008), online at
http://in.reuters.com/article/asiaCompanyAndMarkets/idINPEK1715020080124 (visited May 3,
2010).
21 Economists defend Chinas beigh savings rate, China Daily Online (an 7, 2009), online at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-01/07/content_7375620.htm (visited May 3,
2010). As a point of comparison, the US savings rate has hovered around 2-3 percent over the
past decade. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Economic Accounts: Personal Savings Rate (Mar
26, 2009), online at http://www.bea.gov/briefrm/saving.htm (visited May 3, 2010).
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care less about IPRs than nations that have an "IP trade surplus."22 This makes
intuitive sense. Consider the extreme cases. If nation A owns no IP but reaps the
benefits of using IP owned by other nations, then it is not in the interest of
nation A to have strong IPR enforcement. In fact, nation A would probably
prefer no IPR enforcement since it may then use the IP created by other nations
at no cost. If nation B owns IP but uses no IP owned by other nations, then it is
in nation B's interest to have strong IPR enforcement in order to maintain
ownership over its IP and to exact income, through sales and licenses, from
those other nations who benefit from nation B's IP.
The foregoing explains why the US, a net exporter of IP,23 is vigorous in
enforcing its IP laws and procedures both at home and abroad. By comparison,
China is, by a large margin, a net importer of IP. 24 Chinese companies own only
0.03 percent of the IP associated with key technological products in the Chinese
market.25 Consequently, IPR protection is not a national priority for China. Until
Chinese businesses begin to own IP and thereby develop an interest or stake in
enforcing their IP, IPR enforcement will remain inconsequential to the Chinese
national interest. Restated, until China reduces its IP trade deficit, one can
expect IPR enforcement to remain a problem in China. For Chinese industry to
mature to the point where it begins producing nearly as much or more IP than
what it imports from foreign nations will likely take decades. China's IP trade
deficit is therefore not a cause of China's IPR protection problem that is
resolvable in the short term.
3. Lack of cultural recognition of IPRs.
The concept of IPRs may be culturally unfamiliar to China.26 Most Chinese
may have difficulty understanding how intangible legal property rights can attach
to physical objects like books, music, and computer chip technology. It further
may seem incomprehensible to most Chinese that violating IPRs by making
unauthorized copies of IP-protected goods is a legal and moral wrong
punishable by fines, civil damages, and even prison.27 These cultural attitudes
22 William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Proper y: A Histoy of the Ownership of Ideas in the United
States, Eigentum im internationalen Vergleich 265, 275 (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999); Kim F.
Natividad, Stepping It Up and Taking It To The Streets: Changing Civil r Criminal Copjrght Enforcement
Tactics, 23 Berkeley Tech L J 469, 500 (2008).
23 See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 Cardozo L Rev 331, 344-53 (2003) (describing the US'
transition from an IP importer to an IP exporter).
24 Natividad, 23 Berkeley Tech L J at 500 (cited in note 22).
25 Id.
26 Jordana Cornish, Note, Cracks in the Great Wall: Why China's Copyright Law Has Failed to Prevent
Piray ofAmerican Movies Within Its Borders, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L 405, 422-25 (2006).
27 See id at 422-23.
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may be a result of China's relatively recent emergence from communism. Private
property rights in general have only existed and been respected in the past
generation.28 Shifting the cultural attitudes of the Chinese populace will take time
and is not something that is achievable in the immediate future.
B. Causes That Are Remediable in the Short-Term
There are five short-term causes of China's IPR enforcement problem.
First, China's judicial system is still a work in progress and suffers from
problems of transparency and political influence. Second, many local
communities in China rely economically on IP infringement and are beyond the
effective control of the national government. Third, China fails to adequately
deter IP infringement due to underutilization of the criminal justice system and
weak administrative sanctions. Fourth, market access limitations on imported
IP-protected goods foster the creation of a black market for knockoffs and
illegal copies. Fifth, the vagueness of TRIPS prevents the WTO members, the
US included, from successfully arguing that China is in clear noncompliance
with that agreement. Each of these causes is discussed in detail below.
1. Shortcomings of the Chinese judicial system.
The Chinese judicial system currently suffers from problems that
compromise its ability to enforce China's statutory IP laws effectively. Some of
these problems are natural symptoms of the relative inexperience of the Chinese
judicial system.29 For example, the court system has a shortage of qualified
judges and personnel, particularly in the lower courts.30 This is problematic given
the complexity of IP cases. IP cases require an understanding of IP laws (which
are perhaps not always intuitive), an understanding of economic market
conditions affecting IP-protected goods and, in patent cases, an understanding
of the relevant technology. 3' Because of the judiciary's newness, there is a lack of
prior case law that can aid courts in interpreting statutory IP law and reduce the
judicial cost of deciding cases.
The judicial system also suffers from more idiosyncratic problems that are
not inherent to any nascent legal system. The Chinese judicial system lacks
28 See Frank Lin, Pirag in China: Identifying the Problem and Implementing Solutions, 14 WTR Currents:
Intl Trade L J 83, 84-85 (2005).
29 See Cornish, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L at 426-27 (cited in note 26); Thomas E. Volper, TRIPS
Enforcement in China: A Case forJudicial Transpareng, 33 Brooklyn J Intl L 309, 327 (2007); Chen, 10
Tulane J Tech & Intel Prop at 245-46 (cited in note 1).
30 See Chen, 10 Tulane J Tech & Intel Prop at 245-46 (cited in note 1); Eric Priest, The Future of
Music and Film Pirag in China, 21 Berkeley Tech L J 795, 826-27 (2006).
31 Priest, 21 Berkeley Tech LJ at 826-27 (cited in note 30).
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transparency, as most lower court judicial decisions are unpublished.3 2 This
makes it more difficult for litigants to appeal lower court decisions since they are
uncertain about why they lost.33 Lack of disclosure also stifles the development
of IP case law. Parties and non-parties are therefore uncertain about what the
law is with respect to IP and what their respective rights are. The Chinese
judicial system also suffers from corruption and political influence. 34 In fact, the
judiciary is commonly regarded as an arm or policy-implementing body of the
Communist Party, rather than as an independent institution.35 Political
considerations, not the rule of law, often decide IP cases. Combining political
influence with a lack of transparency and lack of qualified personnel, it is not
surprising that the judicial system also suffers from a lack of uniformity in
36deciding IP cases across and perhaps even within jurisdictions.
The lack of qualified personnel, precedent, transparency, judicial
independence, and uniformity make the Chinese judicial system ineffective as an
institution for enforcing IPRs. Moreover, these problems are also endemic to
China's administrative IP enforcement bodies, such as the State Intellectual
Property Office (SIPO)," the General Administration of Customs, the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce, and the Technical Supervision
Bureau.38 If the judiciary and administrative agencies, the very bodies whose role
is to enforce IPRs, continue to be plagued by the problems discussed here, then
effective IPR protection will not be feasible in China.
2. Local protectionism.
Many local municipalities in China rely on IP infringement for their
economic livelihood.39 The same way that state and local governments in the US
depend on legitimate businesses for tax revenue and employment of their
32 Volper, 33 Brooklyn J Intl L at 329-30 (cited in note 29); Cornish, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L at
428 (cited in note 26).
33 See Volper, 33 Brooklyn J Intl L at 329-30 (cited in note 29); Cornish, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L
at 428-29 (cited in note 26).
34 Volper, 33 Brooklyn J Intl L at 327 (cited in note 29).
3s See id at 328.
36 See id at 331; Priest, 21 Berkeley Tech L J at 826-27 (cited in note 30).
37 See Jeffrey M. Duncan, Michelle A. Sherwood, and Yuanlin Shen, A Comparison Between the Judicial
and Administrative Routes to Enforce Intellectual Pmperty Rights in China, 7 John Marshall Rev Intel Prop
L 529, 543 (2008).
38 See Anna-Liisa Jacobsen, The New Chinese Dynasty: How the United States and International Intellectual
Property Laws Are Failing to Protect Consumers and Inventors From Counterfeiting, 7 Richmond J Global L
& Bus 45, 60 (2008).
39 Cornish, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L at 430 (cited in note 26); Natividad, 23 Berkeley Tech L J at
493 (cited in note 22).
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residents, many local governments in China depend on local Chinese businesses
whose operations involve production and sale of unauthorized copies of IP-
protected goods.40 Not surprisingly, it is in the interest of many local
governments to prevent effective IPR enforcement in order to protect local
businesses, a phenomenon known as "local protectionism."4 1
In addition, local governments in China are highly autonomous.42 They are
beyond the effective control of the national government.43 As a result, even
though the national government has instituted statutory IP law and various
enforcement measures, local governments can easily shield local IP-infringing
businesses from national regulations." In other words, even if the national
government considers IPR enforcement a national priority, local protectionism
and the decentralized power structure of China's government system may offset
any national measures aimed at bolstering IPR enforcement.
3. Under-Deterrence: Underutilization of the criminal system and
weak administrative sanctions.
China's judicial and administrative bodies fail to deter IP infringement
adequately. 45 Businesses and individuals in China who profit from producing and
selling counterfeit goods do not regard the risk or magnitude of sanctions from
China's enforcement bodies as sufficiently severe to deter them from IP
infringing activity.46
The criminal justice system, which provides the most severe remedies for
wrongdoers, such as prison and hefty fines, would naturally be considered the
most effective means of providing deterrence. China's criminal justice system
does in fact provide severe remedies for IP infringement, including prison
sentences of up to seven years.47 However, China fails to use its criminal system
with sufficient frequency to create deterrence. For example, a 2002 estimate
shows that the criminal justice system handled only 1 percent of all IP
4 Cornish, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L at 430 (cited in note 26); Priest, 21 Berkeley Tech L J at 822-
24 (cited in note 30).
41 Priest, 21 Berkeley Tech L J at 822-24 (cited in note 30).
42 Id at 823-24.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 See Stephanie Greene, Protecting Well-Known Marks in China: Challenges for Foreign Mark Holders, 45
Am Bus L J 371, 392-93 (2008); Jessica Haber, Note, Motion Picture Piracy in China: Rated Argh!,
32 Brooklyn J Ind L 205, 217 (2006).
46 See Haber, 32 Brooklyn J Intl L at 217 (cited in note 45).
47 Kanji, 27 Mich J Intl L at 1273 (cited in note 3).
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enforcement actions in China.48 The remaining 99 percent of cases were handled
by less punitive administrative or civil proceedings, which cannot impose prison
as a remedy.4 9
The underutilization of the criminal justice system in China is a result of
high and arbitrary thresholds for what levels of IP infringement qualify as
criminal. 0 Articles 213 to 217 of the Chinese Criminal Code govern criminal
procedures and remedies for IP infringement and provide for significant jail
sentences upon conviction." Article 213 imposes a maximum prison sentence of
not more than three years "if the case is of a serious nature" involving
counterfeiting.5 2 A prison term of three to seven years is imposed "for cases of a
more severe nature.53 Article 214 imposes up to three years in prison for
"relatively large sales" of counterfeit trademarks and three to seven years is
required for "huge" sales.54 However, Articles 213 to 217 are vaguely worded
such that prior to 2004, Chinese courts, unsure as to what scale of IP
infringement qualified as criminal, erred heavily against criminal prosecution. 5
In December 2004, the Supreme People's Court 6  issued a Judicial
Interpretation 1 of Articles 213 to 217 (2004 JI), which set numeric thresholds
for what qualified as criminal infringement.s However, the 2004 JI's thresholds
were very high, allowing many large-scale infringement operations to escape
48 Jacobsen, 7 Richmond J Global L & Bus at 60 (cited in note 38).
49 See Un, 14 WTR Currents: Intl Trade L J at 92 (cited in note 28); Kate C. Hunter, Comment,
Here There Be Pirates: How China Is Meeting Its IP Enforcement Obligations under TRIPS, 8 San Diego
Intl J 523, 543 (2007).
50 Kanji, 27 Mich J Intl L at 1272-73 (cited in note 3).
5' Id at 1273.
52 Greene, 45 Am Bus L J at 392 (cited in note 45).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id; Kanji, 27 MichJ Intl L at 1272-73 (cited in note 3).
56 The Supreme People's Court is China's highest court.
57 Supreme People's Court Justice Jiang Zhipei's website explains what authority the Court has to
issue judicial interpretations: "In accordance with legal provisions, the Supreme People's Court
has the authority to give judicial interpretation on the specific application of the law, so as to
solve knotty legal issues in dealing with the cases, and to ensure the uniformity in applying the
law. The judicial interpretation shall take binding effect and must be observed by all the people's
courts and special people's courts in China, once it is adopted and announced, subject to decision,
by the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People's Court." Jiang Zhipei, judicial Protection ofIPR in
China: Supreme People's Court - People's Republic of China, online at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com
/english/courts/court2.htm (visited May 3, 2010).
58 Kanji, 27 Mich J Intl L at 1273-75 (cited in note 3).
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prosecution." Further, by setting formal numeric thresholds, future infringers
can avoid prosecution by keeping their activities just below the high thresholds."
In addition, the profit thresholds were measured by the value of the unauthoided
copies sold, which is far lower than the fair market value of authorized copies,
thereby making the profit threshold harder to meet.
In direct contrast to China's criminal system, which provides strong
remedies but fails to deter due to underutilization, China's administrative system
is amply utilized but fails to deter due to weak remedies.62 China's administrative
agencies handle over 90 percent of all IP enforcement actions. 63 Administrative
processes are quick, expedient, and lead to high rates of finding liability.64
However, administrative remedies are limited to fines and, at present, these fines
are too low to deter IP infringement effectively." Current fine levels are preset
by statute rather than correlated to actual damages. For example, a popular
Chinese music download site was sued by three Hong Kong record
companies. The damages awarded to the plaintiffs were a mere
$45,000, substantially less than the profits that plaintiffs could have realized had
authorized copies of the music been sold. In another case, a defendant interior
design company lost in a suit and paid only $32,651 in administrative fines.68 By
computing damages based on the quantity of pirated products, plaintiffs will
most likely see an increase in recovery.6 ' As is, infringers tagged with
administrative fines are undeterred from continuing their activities, often
59 See id. The following table shows thresholds for copyright infringement established by the 2004
JI:
Individuals (# of Business Units Profit Gain Punishment
copies) (# of copies) (RmB) (prison)
Over 1,000 Over 3,000 Over 30,000 3 years maximum
Over 5,000 Over 15,000 Over 250,000 3-7 years
60 Kanji, 27 Mich J Intl L at 1274 (cited in note 3).
61 Id at 1274-75.
62 Jacobsen, 7 Richmond J Global L & Bus at 60 (cited in note 38).
63 Id.
64 See Un, 14 WTR Currents: Intl Trade LJ at 92 (cited in note 28).
65 Id at 91.
66 Id at 93.
67 Id.
68 Lin, 14 WTR Currents: Intl Trade L J at 93 (cited in note 28).
69 Id.
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regarding fines as simply part of the cost of doing business.70 In sum, China's
IPR enforcement problem is partly the result of under-deterrence of IP
infringing activity. This under-deterrence in turn is a result of underutilization of
the criminal justice system and the inadequate remedies offered by
administrative bodies, which handle the vast majority of IP cases.
4. Limited market access for imported goods.
China has instituted an array of market access barriers on imported
goods." As of 2004, China imposed the following non-exhaustive list of market
restrictions on imported copyrighted works: (1) a lengthy approval process for
entertainment software tiles; (2) an import quota of twenty films a year; (3) a
grant of monopoly to a state-run company, "China Film," for importation and
distribution of films; (4) restriction of foreign-television broadcasts to no more
than 25 percent of total airtime; and (5) imposition of strong censors on
imported music.7 2 These market barriers prevent or delay the entry of legitimate
copies of IP-protected goods and services into the Chinese consumer market.73
This creates an unmet demand for imported IP protected goods. Domestic
counterfeit and pirated copies fill the resulting gap in supply to meet the unmet
demand. Access barriers imposed on legitimate goods also increase their price to
consumers if and when they do finally reach the market, at which point cheaper
counterfeit copies dominate the market.
5. Vagueness of TRIPS Agreement language.
TRIPS Articles 41 and 61 address IPR enforcement. Both provisions are
vaguely worded. Article 41, which addresses enforcement standards generally,
contains crucial yet indefinite terms such as "effective action" and "expeditious
remedies." 5 TRIPS does not define or clarify either term. Article 61, which
addresses criminal enforcement, contains similarly indefinite terms such as
"commercial scale" and "sufficient to provide a deterrent.', 76 The TRIPS
agreement, particularly in these two articles, reads more as a statement of broad
principles rather than a code of rules and regulations. Consequently, it is difficult
70 Haber, 32 Brooklyn J Intl L at 217 (cited in note 45); Jacobsen, 7 Richmond J Global L & Bus at
60 (cited in note 38).
71 IIPA, 2004 Spedal301 Report at 46-49 (cited in note 2).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Volper, 33 Brooklyn J Intl L at 337 (cited in note 29). See Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon is Over
Evaluating the United States' IVTO Intellectual Propery Complaint Against China, 32 Fordharn Intl L J
96, 143 (2008).
75 TRIPS, Art 41.1 (cited in note 11).
76 Id, Art 61.
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for the US to prevail in a WTO complaint alleging that China is in
noncompliance with TRIPS' enforcement provisions. The flexibility of the
language in Articles 41 and 61 allows China to assert that its procedures and
remedies comply with the broad standards laid out by TRIPS, though piracy and
enforcement data would indicate otherwise. Without the external threat of WTO
sanctions, China has less incentive to strengthen IPR enforcement.
III. PROPOSED MEASURES THAT ARE UNLIKELY TO IMPROVE
CHINA'S IPR ENFORCEMENT
In response to China's weak IPR protection record, US government
officials, business representatives, and academics have proposed various
measures that may induce China to improve its enforcement efforts. Parts A
through C of this Part review proposals that merit consideration but will likely
fail to improve IPR enforcement in China significantly in the short term. Part D
presents a proposal not previously found in the literature, filing a WTO
complaint based on China's noncompliance with TRIPS Article 3.1. An
explanation of each proposal, its merits, and reasons for its ultimate failure
follows.
A. File a WTO Complaint Alleging China is Violating TRIPS
Article 61
Addressing China's underutilization of its criminal justice system," the US
could file a WTO complaint alleging China's noncompliance with Article 61.1.
The US would allege that Articles 213 to 217 of China's Criminal Code and the
2004 JI set arbitrary and exceedingly high thresholds that permit "commercial
scale" IP infringement to occur, violating the first sentence of Article 61.1.78
Further, because China underutilizes criminal procedures and remedies to
enforce IPR's, these procedures and remedies fail to act as a "deterrent" as
required by the second sentence of Article 61.1." If the US ultimately prevails on
this claim, China would likely eliminate numeric thresholds and ease
requirements for what qualifies as commercial scale IPR infringement. This
should result in a large increase in criminal prosecutions enforcing IPRs. A
77 See Part II.B.3.
78 TRIPS, Art 61.1 (cited in note 11). The first sentence provides: "Members shall provide for
criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting
or copyright piracy on a commercial scale." Id.
79 Id. The second sentence provides: "Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or
monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for
crimes of a corresponding gravity." Id.
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greater proportion of IPR cases, previously dealt with by administrative and civil
remedies, would then be subject to potential criminal sanctions, including
prison. This should increase the deterrent effect of criminal remedies.
This proposal is unlikely to succeed because it has been attempted and
failed. As mentioned in Part 1,80 the US filed a WTO complaint on August 13,
2007, alleging among other things that China was in noncompliance with Article
61.1.81 The Panel rejected the US' Article 61.1 allegation (though as explained
above, the US did prevail on its other two claims), finding that China's criminal
procedures and remedies were not inconsistent with the requirements of Article
61.1.82 However, the Panel's decision does not close the door to a successful
future Article 61.1 complaint. In fact, the Panel agreed with the US' broader
interpretation of "commercial scale."8 The Panel's disposition was based on a
finding that the US had failed to meet its burden of proof in showing that China
was failing to remedy and address IP infringement on a commercial scale.84 The
US was unable to present sufficient evidence in support of its contention that
China was underutilizing its criminal system." The decision suggests then that if
the US presented stronger evidence, it would prevail on its complaint. This
inference might be overly optimistic, however. More likely, the real rationale
underlying the Panel's decision is that language of Article 61.1 is intentionally
vague and open-ended. The WTO would prefer to avoid making definitive
rulings on compliance with Article 61.1's requirements. So long as China
provides some avenue of criminal IPR enforcement, the WTO is unlikely to find
a TRIPS violation.
B. Force WTO Members to Pay Dues To The IPR
Enforcement Fund
The WTO could require member states to pay into an "IPR enforcement
fund" through annual membership fees." The fund's proceeds would then be
distributed to China and other member states that have poor IPR enforcement
80 See Part I.
81 China-IP, T 3.1 (cited in note 14).
82 Id, 8.1. See note 15 (noting the US did prevail on its other two claims).
83 Id, ' 7.481 (observing that China argued that "commercial scale" refers only to IP infringing
activity on a large enough scale, while the US interpreted "commercial scale" to include IP
infringing activity occurring on a large scale as well as any IP infringing activity aimed at profit,
regardless of scale). The Panel agreed with the US interpretation. Id, 7.565, 7.576-7.578.
84 Id, TT 7.667-7.669.
5 China-IP, TT 7.667-7.669 (cited in note 14).
86 See Harris, 32 Fordham Intl J at 144, 156 (cited in note 74).
87 Haber, 32 Brooklyn J Intl L at 226 (cited in note 45).
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records." The distribution of funds would be conditioned on their use for IPR
enforcement purposes. For example, the money could be used for increasing
seizure and confiscation efforts, hiring and training judicial and administrative
agency personnel to handle IPR cases, and defraying the costs of judicial and
administrative proceedings. Such a proposal would likely preclude China (and
other recipient nations) from raising an Article 41.5 defense on grounds that
their IPR enforcement efforts are justifiably inadequate due to lack of
resources.8
Creation of such a fund is entirely consistent with the policies and practices
of TRIPS and the WTO. In particular, Articles 66 and 67 recognize that
signatory developing nations may currently lack the resources to comply fully
with substantive TRIPS provisions and may require technical and financial
assistance in satisfying their obligations. 0 More generally, the WTO has, as a
matter of course and historical practice, provided developing countries with
technical and financial assistance in order to further trade liberalization and assist
in the costs of implementing WTO obligations." For example, prior to the
creation of the WTO, GATT technical assistance took the form of "trade policy
courses" taught in Geneva. 92 In September 1995, the WTO launched a $2.5
million fund for technical assistance for least-developed countries and in
December 1996, the WTO announced a collaboration between six international
agencies (including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank) and
bilateral donors to ensure greater coherence in assistance.93 More recently, as
part of the Doha round, the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund was
created for the purposes of "capacity building," with an initial pledge of CHF
21.5 million. 94 Inducing developing nations to comply with international
obligations through capacity-building and international cooperation rather than
88 Id at 227.
89 TRIPS, Art 41.5 ( "It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in place a
judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property rights distinct from that for the
enforcement of law in general, nor does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their law in
general. Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of resources as
between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the enforcement of law in general.")
(cited in note 11).
90 Id, Arts 66-67 (cited in note 11). See also Duncan Matthews and Viviana Munoz-Tellez, Bilateral
Technical Assistance and TRIPS: The United States, Japan, and the Eurpean Communities in Comparative
Perspective, 9(6) J World Intel Prop 629, 629-30 (2006).
91 Gregory Shaffer, Can WFO Technical Assistance and Capadly-Building Serve Developing Countries?, 23
Wis Intl J 643, 651 (2005).
92 Id at 657.
93 Id at 657-58.
94 Id at 660.
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sanctions and confrontational tactics finds foundational support in The New
Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements," a seminal work on
international compliance." An IPR enforcement fund would therefore not be an
unusual or controversial proposal, but a standard approach to resolving capacity
constraints encountered by developing nations. 7
Despite its merits, this proposal is objectionable for three reasons. First,
the proposal faces logistical or practical problems. The WTO would have to
decide which member states are entitled to the fund's proceeds and how much.
After disbursement, the WTO would have to monitor recipient nations to
ensure that the funds are being spent on IPR enforcement. Second, paying
China to improve its IPR enforcement would indirectly recognize that China is
in noncompliance with TRIPS. The "fairer" solution then might just be for the
WTO to require China to comply with TRIPS rather than rewarding China for
noncompliance, thereby creating a moral hazard problem. Third, lack of
financial resources is not among the causes of China's IPR protection problem."
China has the financial wherewithal to enforce IPRs effectively. However, China
simply does not regard IPR enforcement as a national priority worthy of
devoting resources.9 Hence, paying China to enforce IPRs is unlikely to result in
significant improvement. In fact, given that the funds are conditional, it is
possible that China would not accept them.
9s Consider Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with
International Regulatoy Agreements (Harvard 1995).
96 See William C. Bradford, International Legal Compliance: An Annotated Bibliography, 30 NC J Intl L &
Comm Reg 379, 388-89 (2004); W. Bradnee Chambers, Towards an Improved Understanding of Legal
Effectiveness of InternationalEnvironmental Treaties, 16 Georgetown Intl Envir L Rev 501, 509 (2004).
97 Mark A. Drumbl, Povertj, Wealth, and Obligation in International Environmental Law, 76 Tulane L Rev,
843, 852 (2002) ("In fact, capacity-building has become so central to international environmental
diplomacy that many developing countries, who may be particularly lacking in capacity, are
demanding that, before they make any multilateral commitments, developed nations must commit
to the provision of financial resources and technical transfer.").
98 Consider Part II. Lack of financial resources is not among the listed causes of China's IPR
enforcement problem.
99 Wei Shi, Incurable or Remediable? Clues to Undoing The Gordian Knot Tied By Intellectual Propertj Rights
Enforcement in China, 30 U Pa J Intl L 541, 577-78 (2008); Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not
Take Commercial Pirag Seriously, 32 Ohio N U L Rev 203, 224 (2006); Robert Slate, Judicial Copyright
Enforcement in China: Shaping World Opinion on TRIPS Compliance, 31 NC J Intl L & Com Reg 665,
701 (2006); See Cornish, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L at 408 (cited in note 26).
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C. Amend TRIPS To Clarify Enforcement Standards
TRIPS Article 71 permits the Council for TRIPS"oo to "undertake reviews
[of TRIPS] in the light of any relevant new developments which might warrant
modification or amendment of the Agreement."101 Under this proposal, the US
would use Article 71 to request that the Council amend Articles 41 and 61.102
Specifically, the language of those enforcement provisions should clarify what
constitutes "effective action," "commercial scale," and "deterrent." The
amendments may go so far as to specify quantitative metrics for compliance.
Such metrics could include maximum piracy rates, threshold guidelines for
commercial scale, and minimum penalties. 103
This proposal is objectionable for four reasons. First, amending TRIPS in
such a manner would constitute prescribing the rules of decision. Because China
is not in clear violation of current TRIPS provisions, the US would be amending
the provisions such that China will be in clear violation. More importantly, the
amendments would violate one of the underlying assumptions of this paper, that
any US measures should not negatively affect US-China relations.104 Second and
related to the first point, the Council is unlikely to amend TRIPS solely upon the
US' request. The "new developments which might warrant modification"
language suggests that amendment should be pursuant to a broad multilateral
consensus on the need for amendment of TRIPS. The US is likely to face fierce
opposition from China and many developing member nations against instituting
amendments. The US is therefore unlikely to succeed in getting their requested
amendments passed. Third, whatever quantitative metrics are included in the
amendments may be arbitrary and prone to circumvention. For example, an
amendment placed a ceiling of 30 percent on piracy rates. The 30 percent bar
might seem arbitrary as a level where IPR enforcement is deemed effective.
China could step up enforcement such that piracy rates were 29 percent but no
lower. Alternatively, China could manipulate its figures to show lower piracy
rates satisfying the specified threshold. Fourth, WTO member states, including
the US and EU, increasingly regard TRIPS as a statement of principles rather
100 The WTO's website defines the Council for TRIPS as "the body, open to all members of the
WTO, that is responsible for administering the TRIPS Agreement, in particular monitoring the
operation of the Agreement." World Trade Organization, Work of the TRIPS Council, online at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips-e/intel6_e.htm (visited May 3, 2010).
101 TRIPS, Art 71 (cited in note 11).
102 See Haber, 32 Brooklyn J Ind L at 225 (cited in note 45).
103 Id.
104 See Part I.
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than as a strict code of rules and regulations."os Amending TRIPS to include
requirements that are more specific would run counter to this international
consensus and be widely opposed by member states.
D. File a WTO Complaint alleging China is Violating TRIPS
Article 3.1
Article 3.1 of TRIPS articulates the national treatment principle."0 ' The
national treatment principle bars member states from implementing policies that
discriminate or provide less favorable treatment to foreign parties relative to
domestic parties.o' The US could file a WTO complaint alleging that China is in
noncompliance with TRIPS Article 3.1. The complaint could make two
allegations. First, China's market access restrictions on imported IP-protected
goods' 8 constitute discriminatory taxation and regulation of US IPRs. Second,
the Chinese judicial system exhibits more vigorous enforcement of IPRs held by
domestic Chinese parties than foreign US parties. For example, the US might
present statistics demonstrating higher seizure rates, higher fines and penalties,
higher rates of finding liability (in civil and administrative proceedings) or guilt
(in criminal proceedings) when Chinese IPRs are being asserted than in cases
involving US IPRs.
Each of the two allegations of such an Article 3.1 complaint runs into
problems. The first allegation, which relates to import restrictions and tariffs, is
probably not within the purview of the TRIPS agreement. TRIPS is directed at
recognition and enforcement of IPRs.1o' It requires member states to implement
IP laws and create institutions and mechanisms for enforcement of those laws. It
does not relate to broader issues of regulation and taxation of goods and
industries, which fall under the purview of another WTO statute, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI)."10 Therefore, if the US seeks to file a
complaint alleging China's violation of the national treatment principle, it is
unlikely to succeed if the complaint is based on Article 3.1 of TRIPS. It should
105 See Marco Ricolfi, Is There An Antidote Against IP Ove~protection Within TRIPS?, 10 Marq Intel Prop
L Rev 305, 325-26 (2006).
106 TRIPS, Art 3.1 provides, "Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members
treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection
of intellectual property . . . ." (cited in note 11).
107 World Trade Organization, Prinpes of the Trading System, online at http://www.wto.org/english/
theWTO-e/whatis-e/tif-e/fact2_e.htm (visited May 3, 2010).
106 See Part II.B.4.
109 TRIPS, Art 1, 2 (cited in note 11); Chien-Hale, 1626 PLI/Corp at 142 (cited in note 7).
110 See World Trade Organization, GATT and the Goods Coundl, online at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/gatte/gatt-e.htm (visited May 3, 2010).
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instead file a complaint based on one of the sub-provisions of Article III of
GATT, which articulates the national treatment principle for that WTO statute.
The second allegation is unlikely to succeed because of problems of proof.
Favoritism of domestic parties, at least in IPR cases, is not a known
characteristic of the Chinese judiciary. However, concerns of local
protectionism"' and political influence over the judiciaryll 2 intimate the
possibility of "home-state" advantage. Given the Chinese judiciary's lack of
transparency though, collecting enforcement statistics sufficient to make a case
for discrimination will be problematic. Further, in light of China-IP, where the
Panel found against the US' Article 61.1 claim because of inadequate proof,"3
the WTO is likely to place a high evidentiary bar for a showing of discrimination
sufficient to violate Article 3.1. The US would have to provide comprehensive
statistics demonstrating an incontestable and substantial gap in enforcement
outcomes to succeed on its Article 3.1 complaint. Despite this paper's
skepticism, this proposal is worthy of investigation. The US should attempt to
collect statistics on China's seizure rates and judicial and administrative
outcomes in IPR cases. If there is a substantial gap in enforcement of US-owned
IPRs as compared to domestically owned IPRs, then a TRIPS Article 3.1
complaint may succeed. This Comment contends only that such statistics may
be difficult if not impossible to compile and that such a gap in enforcement is
not likely to exist.
E. IPR Education and Training Programs
The US may provide IPR training to Chinese government officials, SIPO
staff, members of the Chinese judiciary, and possibly the Chinese business
community.114 Training would focus on the importance of IPRs for economic
growth and present enforcement techniques."s For example, the US might send
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) officials to China to explain how to
adjudicate various common IPR infringement cases, explaining how to apply IP
laws to given fact patterns and what remedies are appropriate. Providing training
should remedy problems discussed on Part II relating to shortcomings of
111 See Part II.B.2.
112 See Part II.B.1.
113 China-IP, TT 7.667-7.669 (cited in note 14).
114 See Hunter, 8 San Diego Intl L J at 548 (cited in note 49); Cornish, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L at
432 (cited in note 26).
115 Cornish, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L at 432 (cited in note 26).
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China's judiciary, particularly judicial competence and prevailing cultural
attitudes with regard to IPRs."'
This proposal should be implemented. It is low-cost, can only help to
improve China's IPR protection capabilities, and ameliorates US-China relations.
It is, however, unlikely to succeed in bringing about significant short-term
improvement in China's IPR enforcement. Creating a competent judiciary is a
decades-long process. It requires building up case law and developing a legal
education system. Having US representatives provide pointers will not
perceptibly speed up the process. In addition, the shortcomings of China's
judiciary extend beyond mere competence; as Part II.B.1 discussed,"' they
include issues of corruption that IPR training would not resolve. More to the
point, China's weak IPR enforcement is primarily the result of lack of willpower.
China simply does not regard IPR enforcement as a national policy concern.
Because broader policy concerns influence judicial and administrative decisions
in many cases, and because political forces that do not consider IPR
enforcement a priority affect the Chinese judiciary, incremental improvements in
judicial competence are unlikely to provide significantly stronger IPR protection.
IV. A THREE-PRONGED APPROACH: US ACTIONS WHICH
SHOULD IMPROVE CHINA'S IPR ENFORCEMENT IN THE
SHORT-TERM
Three US measures are likely to succeed in inducing China to improve its
IPR enforcement in the short-term. First, the US should file a WTO complaint
alleging China is in noncompliance with TRIPS Article 63.1, which places
transparency requirements on member states' IP adjudication bodies. Second,
the US should negotiate with China to reduce or eliminate existing market access
barriers on US IP-protected goods. Third, the US should execute a bilateral
agreement with China which encourages joint US-China business ventures and
facilitates IP ownership and protection for these joint ventures. The US should
carry out these three measures as a single unified course of action. Each
proposal is assessed below.
A. File an Article 63.1 Complaint with the WTO
The US should file a WTO complaint alleging China's noncompliance with
Article 63.1 of TRIPS with the WTO."8 Article 63.1 provides:
116 See Part I.
117 See Part II.B.1.
118 Volper, 33 Brooklyn J Intl L at 340-42 (cited in note 29); Cornish, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L at
428-29 (cited in note 27).
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Laws and regulations, and final judicial decisions and administrative rulings
of general application, made effective by a Member pertaining to the subject
matter of this Agreement (the availability, scope, acquisition, enforcement
and prevention of the abuse of intellectual property rights) shall be
published, or where such publication is not practicable made publicly
available, in a national language, in such a manner as to enable governments
and right holders to become acquainted with them.'19
Article 63.1 places disclosure requirements on the judiciary of member
states. 120 Countries are obligated to publish judicial and administrative decisions
that pertain to IPRs.12' Unlike Articles 41 and 61, Article 63.1 does not just state
broad principles but enunciates a more exacting rule. As discussed in Part II.B.1,
China's judiciary currently suffers from a lack of transparency.122 At present,
there is no comprehensive and searchable system for Chinese judicial
decisions. 23 The Supreme People's Court publishes a Gazette of judicial
decisions. However, the Gazette is highly edited and contains only a select
proportion of all lower court decisions.124 China's current disclosure practices
therefore fail to meet the requirements of Article 63.1. Given Article 63.1's lucid
requirements, the US should therefore prevail on an Article 63.1 claim. The
WTO will then require China to bring its judicial and administrative disclosure
practices into compliance with Article 63.1.
Note that an Article 63.1 claim does not directly tackle China's weak IPR
record. In contrast to Article 41 or 61 claims, an Article 63.1 claim does not state
that China's IPR enforcement regime is inadequate and fails to comply with
more substantive TRIPS provisions, such as Article 41 or 61. Rather, an Article
63.1 claim addresses technical or procedural flaws in China's enforcement
regime, namely lack of transparency. This indirectness is likely why the US has
not already attempted this approach. Nevertheless, improved transparency
should improve China's IPR enforcement in the short-term for three reasons.
First, with all judicial and administrative decisions subject to publication,
"what the law is" in China with respect to IPRs will become clearer to litigants
and courts. Litigants will develop expectations of what their legal rights are and
adjust their behavior accordingly, taking preventive measures to protect their
IPRs in situations where courts are known to disfavor strong IPR protection and
relying more on adjudication in situations where courts are known to favor
strong IPR protection. Judges and administrative panels will have a larger and
119 TRIPS, Art 63.1 (cited in note 12).
120 Volper, 33 Brooklyn J Intl L at 313 (cited in note 29).
121 Id.
122 See Part II.B.1.
123 Volper, 33 Brooklyn J Intl L at 329 (cited in note 29).
124 Id.
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more complete supply of precedent. from other jurisdictions from which to
decide their cases. As a result, one can expect IPR cases to be decided more
accurately, with greater competence and an increased uniformity of results. In
sum, bringing transparency up to Article 63.1 standards should bolster the clarity
and rule of law in China. The result is increased judicial uniformity and
competence and hence, more effective IPR enforcement. Finally, bolstering the
rule of law reinforces the authority of courts to decide cases, thereby countering
the undesirable influences of local protectionism and political forces.
Second, more transparency will also result in increased scrutiny of Chinese
judicial and administrative agency rulings. Aware that their decisions are publicly
available and subject to review from higher courts, the central government, and
even other WTO states, judges and administrative panels may feel pressured to
"get it right." The Chinese judiciary, particularly lower courts, will be far more
inclined than they are presently, when their decisions are rarely disclosed and
scrutinized, to adjudicate their cases in full compliance with precedence and
statutory IP law. Greater transparency should therefore result in a "race to the
top" whereby Chinese courts, aware that their decisions are accountable to
stringent review and with greater insight into how other Chinese courts are
adjudicating IP cases, compete to reach the most correct and just results. This
should further reinforce the rule of law in IPR cases, thereby increasing judicial
uniformity and competence and lessening the effects of local protectionism and
political interests.
Third, if all judicial and administrative rulings concerning IPRs are
published, this should give the US ammunition to prevail on a substantive
TRIPS Article 41 or 61 claim in the future. Presently, the Chinese judiciary's lack
of transparency makes it difficult for the US to collect sufficient evidence to
prove China is in noncompliance with TRIPS' enforcement provisions.125
Without access to comprehensive records of judicial and administrative rulings,
the US cannot prove that China's enforcement bodies are failing to meet TRIPS
obligations. If China increased disclosure to meet Article 63.1 standards, this
problem would be resolved. The US could compile complete and accurate data
on China's enforcement efforts. The US could then mine the data for evidence
of China's noncompliance with other TRIPS provisions. The US might look for
evidence that the Chinese judiciary systematically disfavors protecting IPRs held
by foreign parties in violation of Article 3.1.126 The US might check whether
China's civil courts consistently rule in favor of defendants in IP infringement
suits where the law and facts would suggest the opposite result in violation of
125 See, for example, China-IP, 7.620-7.652 (suggesting that the evidentiary burden for proving a
violation of one of TRIPS' enforcement provisions is very high) (cited in note 14).
126 See Part III.D.
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Article 41. The US might also observe whether China's criminal courts
frequently fail to prosecute IP infringement occurring on a "commercial scale"
in violation of Article 61. In sum, prevailing on an Article 63.1 claim will give the
US the evidentiary support to do what it cannot do presently-prevail in a WTO
dispute concerning China's noncompliance with a substantive TRIPS provision.
There is limited WTO case law concerning Article 63.1. Thus, its precise
requirements are unclear. The only WTO case presenting an Article 63.1 claim is
India-Patent.12 7 In that case, the US filed a complaint alleging that India's
administrative procedures for processing pharmaceutical and chemical patent
applications failed to comply with Article 70.8.128 In the alternative, the US filed
a claim based on Articles 63.1 and 63.2.129 The US argued that even if India had
in place an administrative process that complied with Article 70.8, India has not
made this process transparent. India thereby violated the judicial transparency
requirements imposed by Articles 63.1 and 63.2.130 The dispute turned on
whether the US could bring an Article 63 claim as an alternative claim
(alternative to its Article 70.8 claim). India argued that Article 63.1 only applied
to scrutinize procedures that were already found to comply with TRIPS.' That
is, Article 63.1 only imposes notice and transparency requirements on
procedures that were already consistent with TRIPS. The Panel disagreed,
concluding that Article 63 imposed transparency requirements on any IP-related
procedures.13 2 The Panel ultimately ruled for the US, finding India had failed to
adequately disclose the operation of its administrative process for approving
pharmaceutical patents.' 3 India had taken no action to publicize its procedures
to the WTO or its member states. India defended its Article 63 compliance by
noting that a written answer to a question in India's Parliament mentioned its
administrative system for processing patents. The Panel found this form of
publication plainly inadequate for Article 63.1 purposes.13" The Appellate Body
later reversed the Panel's ruling on procedural grounds. The Appellate Body
found that the US had never included an Article 63 claim in its original request
127 World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products ("India-Paten), WTO Doc No WT/DS50/R (Sept 5, 1997).
128 Id, 1 3.1(a)-(b).
129 Id,13.1(c).
130 Id, 16.7.
131 India-Patent, 6.7 (cited in note 127).
132 Id, 1 6.8.
133 Id, 7.44-50.
134 Id, 1 7.48.
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for a Panel or in its original written complaint, and therefore, the Panel was
without jurisdiction to rule on Article 63.us
Although India-Patent provides few details on Article 63.1's requirements,
the Panel's decision does provide a few small lessons. First, Article 63 claims can
be brought as an alternative claim to an allegation based on a more substantive
TRIPS provision. In India-Patent, the US' substantive allegation was that India's
administrative patent review procedures failed to comply with Article 70.8. In
the alternative, the US brought an Article 63 claim, arguing that India had failed
to disclose its procedures. The Panel found this tactic perfectly acceptable; the
Appellate Body reversed only because the US had not tacked on its Article 63.1
claim in a timely manner. Applied here, the US could bring an Article 63.1 claim
as an alternative claim in a broader WTO complaint. For example, the US could
file a complaint alleging that China's administrative penalties are inadequate in
violation of Article 41 and alongside it, an Article 63.1 claim seeking disclosure
of historical penalty amounts and standards used to determine penalty amounts.
Second, the Panel's ruling suggests that internal disclosure is insufficient to satisfy
Article 63.1. Documents exchanged within India's parliament did not provide
the transparency contemplated by Article 63.1. Applied here, if China's IP rules,
regulations, and decisions are disclosed only through published documents
internal to the Chinese government, this would be regarded as insufficient.
China must make its IP laws and rulings easily accessible to other WTO member
states and private parties.
China's compliance with Article 63 was disputed in October 2005. The US
filed a request, pursuant to Article 63.3, with China seeking detailed information
from China on its IPR enforcement efforts over the last four years. 3 6 Article
63.3 requires member states to respond to requests for information regarding IP
rules, regulations, and decisions, including turnover of documents relating to
specific adjudications."' In the request, the US asked for information regarding
specific IP piracy cases, methods of resolution, the nature of remedies, and the
various products the IP piracy cases affected. For China's convenience, the US
135 See World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, India-Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WTO Doc No WT/DS50/AB/R, 85-96 (Dec
19, 1997).
136 Konstantina K. Athanasakou, China IPR Enforcement: Hard as Steel or Soft as Tofu? Bringng the
Question to the IVTO Under TRIPS, 39 Georgetown J Intl L 217, 224 (2007).
137 "Each Member shall be prepared to supply, in response to a written request from another
Member, information of the sort referred to in paragraph 1. A Member, having reason to believe
that a specific judicial decision or administrative ruling or bilateral agreement in the area of
intellectual property rights affects its rights under this Agreement, may also request in writing to
be given access to or be informed in sufficient detail of such specific judicial decisions or
administrative rulings or bilateral agreements." TRIPS, Art 63.3.
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cited specific documents, provided examples of possible responses, and allowed
flexibility as to how China could respond with statistical information.'38 China
refused to respond to the US' request, claiming that it had fulfilled its
transparency obligations by making the information on relevant cases and
enforcement of IPR legislation publicly available.'3 1 China also added that the
request failed to specify whether the request was based on Article 63.1 or 63.2.
China also argued that 63.3 imposed no obligation to honor a request.40 In
response, the US stated that China's response provided insufficient
information.141 Chinese commentators disagreed, alleging that the US' request
did not meet the request requirements of Article 63.3. In particular, the US'
request for all IP cases between 2001 and 2004 failed to comply with Article
63.3's requirement that a request relate to a "specific case."1 42
Given this episode's focus on the technicalities of Article 63.3 requests, the
spat provides few answers to the issue of whether China is actually in
compliance with Article 63.1. On the one hand, China's response partly argued
that all its IP rules and decisions were already publicly available. On the other
hand, the US was requesting data and documents that China plainly had not
made available. China's refusal to respond as requested and its resort to
technicalities to deflect the US' requests suggests China's noncompliance. Of
course, China legitimately may have considered the US' requests as a diplomatic
power play, an abuse of Article 63.3. The costs of forming an adequate response
may have been large and some of the requested information may have been
confidential. Regardless, this episode says little about the prospects of US
success in a formal WTO Panel dispute concerning China's Article 63.1
compliance. Further, these events may unfortunately indicate that even
supposing a US victory, with the WTO finding China's judicial and legal
transparency inadequate, China will still refuse to materially improving disclosure
of its IP rules and decisions. That is, the US may win the WTO dispute, but the
victory will be a hollow one with no real effect.
This proposal is not without other potential failings. Increased
transparency may not result in immediate short-term improvement in IPR
enforcement. It may take longer than five years for China to increase
transparency and establish searchable and comprehensive systems of disclosure
that meet Article 63.1 requirements. Moreover, given that the Chinese
138 Kanji, 27 Mich J Intl L at 1282 (cited in note 3).
139 Athanasakou, 39 Georgetown J Intl L at 234 (cited in note 136).
140 Kanji, 27 Mich J Intl L at 1282 (cited in note 3).
141 See id; Yoshifumi Fukunaga, Enforcing TRIPS: Challenges of Adjudicating Minimum Standards
Agreements, 23 Berkeley Tech LJ 867, 917 (2008).
142 Athanasakou, 39 Georgetown J Intl L at 234 (cited in note 136).
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government does not regard IPRs as a national priority and the government's
influence over the judiciary, Chinese courts may feel no pressure from above to
enforce the rule of law in IPR cases. It is possible then that despite disclosure
requirements, Chinese courts and administrative panels will not be responsive
and improve adjudication. On the other hand, if Chinese courts and agencies
continue to prove ineffective, the US could then file an Article 41 or 61 claim.
However, it may be more than five years before the US can collect enough data
to make a sufficiently strong evidentiary showing in support of its claims. In
addition, increased transparency may not result in significant improvement in
IPR enforcement as it does nothing to resolve other short-term causes of
China's weak enforcement. For instance, the proposal does not address local
protectionism. Local economies and governments will still rely on IP
infringement and likely take actions to insulate infringing businesses and
individuals from enforcement actions. The proposal also does not address
market access restrictions that China places on imported IP goods. Fortunately,
the next two proposals do squarely address market access barriers and local
protectionism. Applying the three proposals together as a single course of action
may then provide significant and immediate improvement in China's IPR
enforcement.
B. Eliminate or Reduce Market Access Barriers
The US should induce China to eliminate its market access barriers on
imported IP protected goods. These market access barriers, discussed in Part
II.B.4, reduce or delay the supply of legitimate imported copies, helping to create
an alternate black market for domestically-produced knockoff goods to satisfy
consumer demand. 4 3 By eliminating restrictions on supply, consumers will have
full and prompt access to legitimate copies. This should reduce the impetus for a
black market of infringing copies. In addition, by reducing restrictions on the
supply of legitimate copies, the "cost of goods sold" should be lower for
legitimate copies. This reduction in the cost of placing legitimate copies on the
market should ultimately result in lower prices for consumers. Legitimate copies
will become more affordable for consumers in China. The price discrepancy
between legitimate and illegitimate copies will shrink and hence, diminish relative
demand for illegitimate copies.
The challenge facing this proposal is how the US can actually induce China
to eliminate or reduce its market access barriers. The US may attempt: (1)
bilateral negotiations with China; (2) multilateral WTO negotiations; and (3)
filing a WTO complaint, alleging that China's market access restrictions violate
143 See Part II.B.4.
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provisions of the GATT. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations will require
Chinese cooperation and the US to make certain trade concessions of its own.
Multilateral WTO negotiations would be conducted in the context of the Doha
Development Round.' The Doha Round has stalled primarily over
disagreement on agricultural issues, with the US demanding developing
countries such as China make reductions in tariffs on agricultural goods and
developing countries demanding the US cut agricultural subsidies.145 The US
might therefore, either in the context of bilateral or multilateral talks, offer
concessions on agricultural subsidies in exchange for China eliminating market
access restrictions.
Bilateral talks between the US and China may hold more promise given the
political climate that has engulfed multilateral talks in the Doha Round. The
prior Uruguay Round, ending in 1995, promised developing countries a "grand
bargain" whereby developed countries would open up their markets to exports
from developing countries. In exchange, developing countries would take on
economic and regulatory commitments, TRIPS being but one example.146
Developing countries have since regarded the grand bargain as a grand
betrayal.147 Developed countries, through subsidies and other measures, have not
increased the accessibility of their markets to exports, thus failing to hold up
their end of the bargain from the perspective of developing countries.
Developing countries meanwhile have saddled themselves with commitments
and reforms that have produced in their view, little benefit.148 The hostility
developing countries have developed over the Uruguay Round is a serious
barrier to any constructive exchanges of trade concessions in the ongoing Doha
Round. 14' Developing countries will regard any attempts by developed countries
to impose new commitments and trade liberalization reforms, such as reductions
in market access barriers, with animosity-particularly if developed countries are
unwilling, in exchange, to commit to measures (for example, eliminating
144 See Roland L. Parry, Dismayed powers plea to salvage IVTO talks, Fairfax Digital Newsbreak (July 30,
2008), online at http://news.theage.com.au/world/dismayed-powers-plea-to-salvage-wto-talks-
20080730-3myb.html (visited May 3, 2010).
145 Id.
146 Shirley V. Scott, The Problem of Unequal Treaties in Contemporary International Law: How the Powerful
Have Reneged on the Political Compacts Within Which Five Cornerstone Treaties of Global Governance Are
Situated, 4j Intl L & Intl Rel 101, 118 (2008).
147 See id; see also, Justice Chimugwuanya Nwobike, The WTO Compatible ACP-EU Trade Partnershsf:
Interpreting the Reciprodly Requirement to Further Development, 8 Asper Rev Intl Bus & Trade L 87, 115-
18 (2008).
148 See William A. Lovett, Beyond DOHA: Multfpolar Challenges for a Globalized World, 17 Tulane J Intl
& Comp L 3, 19 (2008).
149 See id.
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agricultural subsidies) that will substantially increase the accessibility of their
domestic markets to exports. Bilateral talks between solely the US and China
may avoid the vitriol that embroils multilateral WTO negotiations and hold
greater promise of constructive compromise that will ultimately lead to a
reduction in China's market access barriers.
Filing a WTO complaint against China has the advantage of not requiring
Chinese cooperation. The precise claims in the US' complaint will depend on the
particular market restriction the US is attacking. For instance, the fact that China
subjects only imported music to government censors might violate Article 111:4
of the GATT, which bars discriminatory regulation."so Not all of China's market
restrictions, however, are visible WTO violations. China's lengthy approval
process for entertainment software tides applies equally to domestic and foreign
titles. It is not discriminatory in any way and simply reflects poor domestic
policy and inefficient administration. A WTO complaint therefore fails to
pinpoint many of China's market restrictions.
The problem with reducing market access barriers is then a matter of
execution or "getting there." In addition, even if China agrees to a reduction in
market restrictions, this will not completely eliminate the incentive for knockoff
goods. While the supply of legitimate copies will be more plentiful and
affordable, knockoffs will still be sold at a fraction of the price. Demand for
counterfeit copies, while diminished, will remain and a black market will still
exist.
Despite these concerns, this proposal should be implemented. If the US
can induce China to eliminate its market restrictions, the benefits will be
immediate and significant. The stimuli for a black market are: (1) lack of or
delayed supply of legitimate goods, in which case the black market provides a
substitute supply of infringing copies; and (2) the discrepancy in price to
consumers, since infringing copies are far cheaper. By eliminating market
restrictions, the first stimulus is promptly eliminated, since there is no longer a
limited or delayed supply of legitimate goods. The second stimulus of price will
remain, but will be diminished because of the lower cost of placing legitimate
copies onto the market. The net result is a substantial and immediate reduction
in IPR infringing activity.
150 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") (1947), Art 111:2, 55 UN Treaty Ser 187, 206
(1950). Since then, the provision has been moved to Art 111:4, which provides: "The products of
the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use." See Text of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (July 1986), Art I1I:4, online at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
gatt47_e.pdf (visited May 3, 2010).
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C. Execute a Bilateral Agreement To Encourage Joint
Ventures
The US should enter into a bilateral agreement with China that encourages
US firms seeking to do business in China to do so via joint venture with a
Chinese partner firm."' Through joint ventures, Chinese partner firms will have
a stake in the economic success of the venture.'52 Chinese partner firms will then
also have an interest in obtaining and protecting IPRs, which are vital to the
profitability of the joint venture. The proposal will help cut China's "IP trade
deficit" discussed in Part II.'" While Part II classified China's IP trade deficit as
a long-term cause of China's poor IPR enforcement record, an increase in joint
ventures should present short-term improvement in IPR enforcement. The
discussion in Part II of China's net importation of IP assumed that balancing the
IP deficit would take decades, requiring a maturation of Chinese industry and
technological capabilities before Chinese businesses can begin to create and take
ownership of substantial amounts of IP. However, joint ventures should
accelerate that process. Chinese firms would immediately take partial ownership
and an economic interest in the IPRs held by their US partner firm. Further,
with the help of the technical and creative expertise of their US partner, Chinese
firms may increasingly develop their own IPRs. Joint ventures may also combat
local protectionism.'5 4 Greater domestic ownership of IPRs means local firms
and industries will shift their operations from production of knockoff goods and
towards production of legitimate copies as part of their joint venture. Local
Chinese governments will then shift their economic reliance on black market
companies towards reliance on joint ventures who own IPRs. As a result, local
governments will develop an interest in protecting and enforcing IPRs.
Both sides of the joint venture may also aid each other in enforcement of
their jointly held IPRs. The US firm, with its experience in the US judicial
system, may be more accustomed to filing patent applications and trademarks
and copyright registrations and pursuing infringement actions aggressively. The
Chinese firm may be more accustomed with the workings and tendencies of the
Chinese judiciary and agencies. Joint ventures will make Chinese businesses
more familiar with IP ownership and assertion of their IPRs against infringers.
With a greater domestic stake in IPRs, IPR enforcement may become a national
priority, one in which the Chinese government begins investing to meet
international standards.
151 See Cornish, 9 Vand J Enter & Tech L at 434-35 (cited in note 26).
152 Id.
153 See Part II.A.2.
154 See Part II.B.2.
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Market forces have already provided some incentive for joint ventures
between US and Chinese companies. General Motors (GM) currently has
entered partnerships with Chinese manufacturers to produce GM vehicles in
China, with Chinese manufacturers taking 66 percent ownership in the
combined venture."' The joint venture presents business benefits for both sides.
GM can outsource its manufacturing operations (which may be costly and time-
consuming to establish and operate) and Chinese manufacturers may operate
more cheaply thereby saving GM expenses.' 6 Chinese manufacturers benefit
from technological transfer and sharing in the profits derived from the joint
venture.'5 7 Microsoft has also gotten into the act. Starting in 2002, the US
software giant has invested $750 million in joint ventures with China's software
industry and $24 million per year over three years to develop research programs
with Chinese universities.' 58 While Microsoft's agreements do not address IPRs,
Microsoft has stated that the agreement endeavors to foster Chinese
development and creation of IP-protected goods. That in turn will lead to
improvements in China's IPR regime.5 9
The purpose of the bilateral agreement between the US and Chinese
governments is to further promote joint ventures, providing incentives for their
formation beyond those already bestowed by market forces. The bilateral
agreement will contain provisions that provide comparative advantages for US
and Chinese companies that form joint ventures, particularly as those advantages
relate to IPRs. Hypothetical provisions include: (1) tax breaks or subsidies for
joint ventures; (2) giving the Chinese firm in the joint venture at least 50 percent
ownership in any IPRs held by the joint venture, at least in China; (3) exempting
joint ventures from filing fees associated with applications for IP (for example,
patent applications, trademark registration) and enforcement procedures (court
and administrative agency filing fees); (4) any IPRs already registered with the
PTO by the US half of the joint venture is automatically entitled to registration
with SIPO in China; and (5) special fee-shifting or burden-shifting provisions
which favor the joint venture in judicial proceedings in which a joint venture
alleges IP infringement. The aims of these provisions are to increase the
economic appeal of joint ventures, give the Chinese half of the joint venture a
stake in the IPRs held by the venture, and to facilitate IPR ownership and
155 Vivian W. Kwok, GM Wants Bigger Piece of China Joint Venture, Forbes Gan 18, 2008), online at
http://www.forbes.com/2008/01/18/gm-shanghai-automotive-markets-equity-cx vk.0118
markets04.html (visited May 3, 2010).
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 Hillary Hollingsworth, The Questfor Thought Protection, 1 Bus L Brief (Am U) 45, 50 (2004).
159 Id.
Vol 11 No. 13 16
A Three-Pronged Approach
enforcement by lowering the costs of IPR ownership and enforcement actions.
These provisions will provide incentives, in addition to profit motive and market
forces, for Chinese firms to assert their IPRs actively. This will reduce China's IP
trade deficit and familiarize Chinese firms with the legal rights and economic
benefits conferred by IPRs. Chinese businesses and the government may then
come to recognize IPRs as a national priority and develop the political will to
bolster their IPR enforcement efforts.
This proposal faces three objections. First, it is unclear whether many of
the bilateral agreement's provisions for joint ventures are actually acceptable
under WTO rules and regulations. Providing subsidies and lowering the costs of
IPR ownership and enforcement for joint US-China ventures may violate the
national treatment principle of the GATT,6 o the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM)"' and TRIPS.'62 Overcoming this objection
could involve turning the bilateral agreement into a multilateral one, extending
its incentives for joint ventures to companies from all nations seeking to do
business in China. However, extending the agreement in such a manner would
require the consent and support of all other nations. Some nations may find it
undesirable to place foreign companies that seek to "go it alone" in China at a
comparative disadvantage.
Second, it is unclear whether China would consent to such a bilateral (or
multilateral) agreement encouraging joint ventures. Such an agreement would
place purely domestic Chinese firms at an economic disadvantage relative to
joint ventures. It would also result in lost government revenue due to subsidies,
tax breaks, and waiver of fees. China would weigh these sacrifices against the
benefits to Chinese industry from joint ventures such as technology transfer,
increased economic output, and job creation.
Third, the US may find it objectionable that in order for US companies to
do business in China, US companies are compelled by the bilateral agreement to
form partnerships with Chinese firms. This reduces the autonomy of US
companies to dictate how they want to do business in China. It also forces US
companies to share profits and ownership with their Chinese partners. The
bilateral agreement's provisions, however, are intended to make joint ventures
economically appealing, through subsidies, tax breaks, and facilitation of IPR
ownership and enforcement. These incentives, in addition to those inherent to
joint partnerships, may provide advantages that outweigh a US company's
concerns over joint ventures. Further, US companies may find that "going it
160 GATT, Art III (cited in note 150).
161 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 ILM 1125 (1994).
162 TRIPS, Art 3 (cited in note 11).
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alone" is problematic, in light of lack of familiarity with the Chinese market,
business regulations, government corruption, and rampant IP infringement.
Forming partnerships with domestic Chinese firms may alleviate these problems.
The Chinese firm will have greater understanding and experience with the
Chinese market and regulations. Forming partnerships with Chinese firms may
curry favor with Chinese government regulators and officials. The bilateral
agreement's provisions also help joint ventures enforce their IPRs against
infringement. Overall, most US companies are likely to welcome the bilateral
agreement as assisting opportunities to do business in China.
V. CONCLUSION
For the past decade, weak IPR protections in China cost US businesses
tens of billions of dollars every year in lost revenue. Weak IPR protections create
a considerable disincentive for US businesses seeking access to the Chinese
consumer market, and account for approximately one-quarter of the politically
and economically contentious US-China trade deficit. This Comment has sought
to examine what measures the US can take to resolve the situation and induce
China to improve its IPR enforcement. Part I outlined the scope of the problem
and stated the paper's two assumptions: first, the broad cause of China's weak
IPR enforcement is lack of willpower or concern rather than lack of law or
capability, and second, that any initiatives the US undertakes to remedy the
situation cannot harm US-China diplomatic and economic relations. Part II
discussed the causes of China's weak IPR enforcement record in detail,
classifying those causes that are not conducive towards short-term remedy and
those that are. Part III assessed proposed US measures that are unlikely to result
in a significant short-term improvement in China's IPR enforcement.
Part IV presented three measures that, if carried out as a uniform plan of
action, are likely to result in a significant improvement in China's IPR
enforcement in the near future. First, the US should file a WTO complaint
alleging China's violation of Article 63.1 of TRIPS, which places minimum
transparency requirements on the IPR enforcement bodies of member states.
Improved transparency may cause China's enforcement bodies to improve the
competency and uniformity of their adjudications. Improved transparency also
provides the US with evidentiary support to file a more substantive WTO
complaint in the future under Article 41 or 61. Second, the US, either through
bilateral or multilateral WTO negotiations, or by filing a WTO complaint
alleging Chinese violation of the GATT, should induce China to reduce or
eliminate its current market access restrictions. These market access restrictions
account in large part for the vitality of China's black market for counterfeit
goods. Third, the US should execute a bilateral agreement with China providing
incentives for US companies seeking to do business in China to form joint
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ventures with Chinese companies. These incentives should target facilitating
Chinese ownership and enforcement of IPRs. Joint ventures will reduce China's
IP trade deficit and help turn IPRs into a national priority.
While this Comment proposes that initiating the three foregoing proposals
as a single plan of action will present the strongest opportunity for improved
IPR enforcement in China, it may be the case that complete and effective IPR
enforcement is not possible in China in the short-term. It may be that for
China's IPR enforcement to reach the level of efficacy found in the US or other
OECD nations, China must achieve the same socioeconomic conditions as
those found in OECD nations. It may be that so long as Chinese incomes are
far lower than the OECD average, there will be strong consumer demand for
counterfeit goods. So long as this demand exists, a black market will necessarily
exist as well. Perhaps until China evens its IP trade balance or cultural attitudes
regarding IP change, fully effective IPR enforcement is not possible. In addition,
modernizing the Chinese judiciary and breaking down the autonomy of local
municipalities might take decades, though Part II classified them as short-term
causes of China's IPR problem. The core point remains. China's IPR
enforcement problem may not come close to being fully resolved within a five-
year period. While US measures may induce some improvement, such actions
are more likely to act as a stopgap rather than complete answers.
Finally, this Comment conducted a sweeping review of China's IPR
problem as it currently stands, surveying causes and proposed solutions. This
Comment does not provide definitive logistical details on how to implement
various proposed measures. For instance, this paper leaves open what precise
provisions and incentives should be included in a bilateral US-China agreement
encouraging joint ventures. Many proposals and arguments are couched as
possibilities and probabilities contingent on unknown facts.' 63 This Comment
thus acts only as a starting point, providing a preliminary examination of various
proposals mostly found in the existing literature. Additional investigation into
these proposals is recommended. In particular, it would be valuable to conduct
an analysis of Chinese judicial and administrative agency rulings and remedies in
IPR cases, compiling statistics to adjudge the exact failings of these enforcement
bodies and whether these institutions exhibit discrimination against foreign
parties in violation of the national treatment principle.'64 Such data, however, is
hard to collect, which is why the paper advocates strongly for filing an Article
63.1 complaint. Through more vigorous future investigation, the US will gain a
clearer picture of what actions hold the most promise in improving China's IPR
enforcement record.
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